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Abstract
This paper analyzes a discriminatory share auction in which bidders submit non-
increasing step functions with a bounded number of steps, the type space consists of
private non-increasing marginal valuation functions, and the number of participants is
random. I show that the interim utility can be written as a simple functional of the dis-
tribution of the allocated quantity. This allows me to derive equilibrium existence and
to give a characterization of the equilibrium bid schedules in terms of the individual bid-
ders’ optimality conditions. The characterization facilitates the formulation of bounds on
the estimates of marginal valuations between the submitted quantity points and permits
a simple estimator of the fraction of best response violations among the submitted bids.
Proofs of concept for the bounds and the estimator are given by using a novel data set
from meat import quota auctions in Switzerland.
Keywords: Discriminatory Share Auctions, Random Participation, Estimation
JEL-Classifications: D44, C57
1 Introduction
In a share auction bidders compete for the allocation of a divisible good by submitting demand
schedules for the shares of the good. Such auctions are a popular means to sell, for example,
treasury bonds, electricity, environmental permits, or import quotas. Recently, the empirical
interest in such share auctions has surged, and the main interest lies on the most common
variant of the share auction in which the bidders’ demand schedules must be of the form of a
vector of price-quantity points with an upper bound on the permitted number of such points
(cf. Kastl, 2011; Hortaçsu and Kastl, 2012; Cassola et al., 2013).
At the center of the research on such step function share auctions is the observation that the
bidders’ optimality conditions with respect to the submitted quantities yield a map from the
demand schedules and the equilibrium distribution of the received quantity to the marginal
valuation at the submitted quantity points. This map allows the marginal valuation at the
submitted quantity points to be identified from the data: The demand schedules can be di-
rectly observed, and the estimator of the equilibrium distribution of the received quantity can
be approximated with a simple resampling procedure that returns the empirical distribution
∗This paper has evolved from the third part of my dissertation at the University of Basel. I am indebted to my
supervisor Yvan Lengwiler for ongoing support, and to Georg Nöldeke for many helpful comments.
†University of Basel, Faculty of Business and Economics, Peter Merian-Weg 6, CH-4002 Basel, Email:
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of a series of realized quantities which are constructed by repeatedly drawing from the set of
submitted demand schedules (Kastl, 2011).
Two caveats apply to this unarguably very elegant approach: First, the resampling proce-
dure makes assumptions on the type space (including, for example, bidder independence and
ex ante bidder symmetry both within and across the auctions covered by the data) that are
neither directly falsifiable with the data nor indirectly with the optimality conditions used.
Needless to say, starting from invalid assumptions on the type space potentially leads to er-
roneous estimation. Second, the characterization of the equilibrium demand schedules using
the optimality conditions with respect to the submitted quantities only identifies the marginal
valuations at the submitted quantity points, so that the marginal valuation between the sub-
mitted quantity points remains unidentified. Even though the assumption of non-increasing
marginal valuations allows to derive a lower bound on the whole support and an upper bound
from the second step onward by using the point estimates at the submitted quantities, an upper
bound on the first step remains unfeasible. Consequently, it is only feasible to draw inference
from the bidding data to a lower bound on realized rents in the auction, but not so to an upper
bound. Furthermore, the bounds are unlikely to be very tight when the number of submitted
steps is few.
This paper revisits and extends the underlying theoretical model for the case of a discrim-
inatory payment rule (developed in Kastl (2012), applied in Hortaçsu and Kastl (2012) to
Canadian treasury auctions), and addresses these two caveats: First, it describes a procedure
to bound the bidders’ marginal valuations between the submitted quantity points over the
whole support, and thus is the first to formulate an upper bound on the marginal valuations
for the first step. Second, it presents an estimator for the share of price-quantity points that
violate best response behavior for a given set of assumptions on the type space made in the
resampling procedure. The estimator can thus be used as a selection criterion between dif-
ferent type space assumptions that is based on the degree of bidder irrationality required so
that the model is consistent with the observed data.
The discriminatory share auction in which bidders must submit non-increasing step-func-
tions studied here is a variant of the discriminatory share auction studied in Wilson (1979)
where bidders are allowed to submit any non-decreasing bid schedule. I assume that the size
of the good is normalized to one, the value of the good to the seller is zero, and bidders are
characterized by a non-increasing marginal valuation function on the shares of the good. The
distribution of valuations is atomless, and the valuations are private and possibly dependent.
The auctioneer has zero valuation for the good, sets the clearing price equal to the highest
price such that aggregate demand is greater than unity, considers all quantity-price pairs with
prices weakly above the clearing price and resolves potential ties with a pre-announced tie-
breaking rule. The payment rule is discriminatory, that is, each bidder pays the area under
his bid schedule up to the received share.
The model differs from that in Kastl (2012) in three respects. First it allows for (ex-
ogenous) stochastic participation: besides drawing the marginal valuations for the bidders,
nature decides which subset of bidders is active in the auction. This is equivalent to assum-
ing that with some probability each bidder has a valuation of zero for the good, and hence
does not participate. Fluctuating numbers of bidders over time, albeit a prevalent feature of
most series of share auctions conducted, have not yet been incorporated either in the theo-
retical model nor in the estimation. Second, the tie-breaking rules considered here are more
general than that in Kastl (2012) who only considers the pro-rata-on-the-margin rule. The
tie-breaking rules that I consider allocate the tying bidders with a quantity lying in the set of
shares at which the clearing price is submitted. That is, the tie-breaking rules also include,
for example, random rationing rules as analyzed in McAdams (2008) for multi-unit auctions.
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Third, while Kastl (2012) considers finite-dimensional types that determine the marginal val-
uation function of the bidders, the type space considered here is that of all uniformly bounded
non-increasing functions on [0,1]. Such an infinite type space seems to be most natural given
that the bidders are characterized by marginal valuation functions.
In Section 2, I show existence of an equilibrium in distributional strategies (Proposition
1). To do so, I first consider an auction with a discrete action space for which existence is
established with the arguments of Milgrom and Weber (1985). Using results developed in
Reny (1999) and Reny (2011), I then show that, by considering equilibria along a sequence
of auctions with discrete action spaces that becomes dense in the continuous action space,
I can construct a converging sequence of ε-equilibria whose limit is an equilibrium of the
auction with the continuous action space. This approach is an alternative to that employed in
Kastl (2012) who first constructs a sequence of equilibria using a sequence of auctions with
ever finer grids on the action spaces that are such that no ties can occur and then shows that
the limit of this equilibrium sequence is an equilibrium in the auction with the continuous
action space.
The insights from the proof of the existence result together with Lemma 1 – establishing
that the interim utility in the share auction is the continuous analogue to the interim utility
of a bidder in the multi-unit auction as derived in McAdams (2008) – allow me to derive the
equilibrium characterization in Proposition 2. The characterization makes use of the optimal-
ity conditions both with respect to the submitted quantities and with respect to the submitted
prices by a bidder, and thus goes beyond the characterization given in Kastl (2012) who only
derives the optimality conditions with respect to the submitted quantities. The additional
structure on the equilibrium bids gained from the optimality conditions with respect to the
prices allows me both to construct the bounds on the marginal valuations between the sub-
mitted quantities as well as to formulate an estimator for the share of price-quantity pairs that
violate the best response.
Section 3 derives pointwise bounds on the marginal valuations. To do so, I resort to the
optimality conditions with respect to prices. Technically, the optimality conditions with respect
to prices are special cases of homogeneous Fredholm equations of the first kind which have an
infinite number of solutions (cf. e.g. Jerri, 1999). I show how the assumption of decreasing
marginal valuations can be fruitfully employed to construct two maps that return for any
hypothetical upper bound on the valuations a greatest lower bound on the set of valuations
that satisfy the optimality conditions, and conversely, for any hypothetical lower bound on the
valuations a least upper bound on the set of valuations satisfying the optimality conditions.
It is straightforward to establish that there is a partial order such that these two maps have
a set of fixed points which is a complete lattice and which contains the least upper bound
and the greatest lower bound of the set of valuations satisfying the optimality conditions with
respect to prices. This implies that the least fixed point of the maps constitutes an upper and
a lower bound on the set of such valuations. I present a simple fixed point iteration algorithm
to find this least fixed point for which the initial conditions – here: rough initial guesses of
the bounds – can be obtained from the data.
Section 4 first presents the estimator of the equilibrium distribution of the received quan-
tities, which is then, in a second step, used for the estimation of the share of submitted price-
quantity pairs that violate best response behavior. The estimator of the share of best response
violations makes use of the observation that, while the optimality conditions with respect to
quantities uniquely determine the marginal valuation at any submitted quantity for a given bid
schedule and a given equilibrium distribution of the received quantity, the optimality condi-
tions with respect to prices can be used to construct upper and lower bounds on the valuations
at the submitted quantity points for a given bid schedule and a given equilibrium distribution
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of the received quantity. Together, this gives a necessary condition for a price-quantity pair to
be consistent with best response behavior. Crucially, this condition depends on the bid sched-
ule and the equilibrium distribution of the received quantity alone, and can hence be tested
with the data. The share of best response violations thus estimated then gives us a picture of
how much irrationality in the bidders’ behavior has to be assumed if the assumptions on the
type space underlying the resampling procedure to approximate the winning probability esti-
mator are taken to be valid. The implementation of this resampling procedure, together with
the implementation of the fixed point iteration to obtain the bounds, is presented in Section
5.
Section 6 finally presents the respective proofs of concept for the bounds and the estimator
of best response violations using bidding data from the monthly Swiss import quota auctions
for high quality beef. The aim of Section 6 is twofold: First, I show the result of the algo-
rithm to bound valuations under the assumption that bidders play best response behavior for
individual bidders, and then compare estimates of lower bounds on the total ex post rent in
the auctions obtained with the algorithm to those obtained with more naive bounds. Second,
I emphasize the importance of having a correct notion of the type space when running the
resampling procedure: I compare different type space variants, and show that the fraction
of best response violations varies greatly across the scenarios. All proofs are found in the
appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Types, Actions, Strategies
A perfectly divisible good is sold by auction. The size of the good is normalized to one, and
the value of the good to the seller is zero. The number of potential bidders is n≥ 2, and the
potential bidders are indexed by i = 1,...,n.
Before the auction starts, nature assigns each bidder bidder i with a non-increasing func-
tion vi : [0,1]→ [0, v¯], v <∞, returning the marginal valuation vi(q) that bidder i attaches
to share q ∈ [0,1] of the good. I call V the space of possible valuations vi and assume it is
equipped with metric dv induced by the supremum norm. Valuations are private information,
but they need not be independent. The commonly known distribution of valuation profiles
v = (v1, ..., vn)∈ V n is described by a probability measure η on the Borel subsets of V n with a
marginal distribution ηi on V for each bidder i.
(A1) The measure η is absolutely continuous with respect to the product of its marginals, i.e.
with respect to η1× ...×ηn.
(A2) For all bidders i = 1,...,n, it holds that, if X ⊂ V satisfies ηi(X ) > 0, then there are
X ′,X ′′⊂ X with ηi(X ′),ηi(X ′′)>0 where ∀ f ∈ X ′ and ∀g ∈ X ′′ it holds that f (q)> g(q),∀q ∈ [0,1].
Assumption (A1) is satisfied, for example, if the individual bidders’ valuations are independent
(cf. Milgrom and Weber, 1985, for a discussion). Assumption (A2) states that any set of
valuations with strictly positive measure contains two sets of strictly positive measure where
all elements of one set are greater than all elements of the other set under the pointwise
partial order. I write v−i =(v1, ..., vi−1, vi+1, ..., vn) for the elements of type profile v other than
bidder i’s type, and denote by η−i(v−i|vi) the distribution of opponent profiles v−i given the
realized valuation of bidder i is vi .
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I model stochastic participation by assuming that besides the realization of valuations
nature decides for each bidder i whether that bidder is allowed to be active in the auction or
not. I capture this by the variable ai , where a value ai =1 indicates that bidder i is active and a
value ai =0 indicates that bidder i is inactive. I assume that ai and vi are independent for every
bidder i. As with the valuations vi , nature’s draw of ai is private information, but participation
need not be independent across bidders. The commonly known probability that participation
profile a=(a1, ...,an)∈{0,1}n realizes is given by g(a), where it holds that∑a∈{0,1}n g(a)=1.
I define g−i(a−i|ai) as the probability that the opponent participation profile a−i ∈ {0,1}N−1
realizes given participation of bidder i is ai .
The active bidders i submit k≥ 1 price-quantity pairs (p ji ,q ji ) ∈ [0, p]× [0,1], j = 1,...,k,
where 0 < p <∞ denotes the maximal price bid to be submitted. The number k is fixed
and common knowledge among all potential bidders. A feasible action of active bidder i is a
k-tuple bi of price-quantity pairs,
bi =
 
p1i ,q
1
i

,
 
p2i ,q
2
i

, ...,
 
pki ,q
k
i
	∈ [0, p]×[0,1]k,
where the price-quantity pairs (p ji ,q
j
i ) satisfy p ≥ p ji ≥ p j+1i ≥ 0, and 0≤ q ji ≤ q j+1i ≤ 1, j =
1,...,k, pk+1i = 0, q
k+1
i = 1. This gives us the set B of feasible actions for the active bidders.
Inactive bidders, on the other hand, are not allowed to submit a demand schedule. Rather,
nature submits for every inactive bidder i a bid bi from the set B0 of zero bids given by
B0 = {bi ∈ B : p ji = 0, j = 1,...,k}.
Under the auction rules that I will consider such a zero bid never results in a strictly positive
quantity allocated and neither affects the winning probability of the active bidders. The bids
of all active and inactive bidders are taken together in the vector b≡ (b1, ..., bn)∈Bn of feasible
bids that I call a bid profile.
I consider distributional strategies (Milgrom and Weber, 1985): A feasible strategy for
bidder i conditional on being active in the auction consists in a probability measure µi over
the product of bidder i’s action space and type space, that is, over B×V , where the marginal
distribution of the type space is ηi . In other words, for any X ⊂ V we have µi(B×X )=ηi(X ).
The set of all such probability measures on B×V is denoted byM , and individual strategies
are collected in the strategy profile
µ= (µ1, ...,µn)∈M n.
I write µ−i for those elements in the strategy profile µ other than the strategy of bidder i, that
is, µ−i =(µ1, ...,µi−1,µi+1, ...,µn), and µi(.|vi) for bidder i’s distribution over B conditional on
valuation vi .
2.2 Allocation Rules
It will be convenient to use the price-quantity tuples bi ∈ B to define left-continuous step-
functions βbi : [0,1]→ [0, p] as
βbi (q) =
k∑
j=1
p ji ·1{q ∈ (q j−1i ,q ji ]},
where 1{.} denotes the indicator function and I assume q0i = 0 and βbi (0) = p1i . Let
β−1bi (p) =max

q ∈ [0,1] : βbi (q)≥ p
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be the quantity demanded by player i at price p with the maximum of the empty set taken to
be 0 by convention.1
For a realized bid profile b∈ Bn that has at least one bidder submitting at least one strictly
positive price-quantity pair, the auctioneer chooses the price pc > 0 – henceforth called the
clearing price – such that the market clears or, if there is no such price, equal to the lowest
strictly positive price bid submitted, that is,
pc =max
¨
max
¨
p ∈ [0, p] :
n∑
i=1
β−1bi (p)≥ 1
«
,min
¦
p ∈ {p ji }i∈{1,...,n}, j∈{1,...,k} : p> 0
©«
,
where, again, the maximum of the empty set taken to be 0. The clearing price pc determines
the allocation of the good: if the total demand at pc is weakly smaller than one, then all
demand at pc is served. If, on the other hand, total demand at pc is strictly greater than
one, then at least one bidder will be rationed. There are two possibilities for this to happen:
First, there might be a single bidder i submitting a bid p ji = p
c for some j ∈ {1,...,k} with
total demand exceeding one, and second, there might be more than one bidder i submitting
p ji = p
c for some j ∈ {1,...,k} (where the index j might differ for the bidders). In either
case, the allocation rule gives priority to high bids, that is, first the price-quantity pairs with
prices strictly above the clearing price are served. Then, in the first case, the bidder having
submitted p ji = p
c for some j ∈ {1,...,k} is allocated the residual supply at pc . In the second
case – which I will henceforth call a tie – rationing among the tying bidders occurs according
to some commonly known rationing rule.
Formally, rationing rules are represented as follows: For a given bid profile b ∈ Bn, the
rationing rule together with the allocation rule discussed in the paragraph above induces a
distribution H b : [0,1]n→ [0,1] of the received quantities qci ∈ [0,1], where
∑
i∈N qci =1 holds
with certainty. Every bidder i is faced with a marginal distribution H bi of the received quantity
qci ∈ [0,1] which is assumed to be measurable in b for every q∈ [0,1]. While the price-quantity
pairs above the clearing price pc are allocated with probability one, the received quantity
qci ∈ [0,1] for the tying bidders lies in the interval at which the submitted price is equal to the
clearing price with probability one:
(A3) For a given clearing price pc , any bidder i ∈ {1,...,n} and for bids j ∈ {1,...,k} it holds
pc < p ji ⇒ lim
q↑q ji
H bi (q) = 0
pc = p ji ⇒ H bi (q ji )− lim
q↑q j−1i
H bi (q) = 1
pc > p ji ⇒ H bi (q j−1i ) = 1.
As will be established below, it follows from (A3) together with (A2) that whenever there
are ties with positive probability, there are tying bidders that strictly prefer to avoid the tie,
implying that ties happen in equilibrium with a probability of zero. This in turn allows me to
show equilibrium existence and is also important for the equilibrium characterization.
Rationing rules satisfying (A3) include the pro-rata-on-the-margin rationing rule analyzed
by Kastl (2012) and the share auction analogue to the random rationing rule employed in
McAdams (2003) for multi-unit auctions, but excludes the pro-rata allocation rule discussed
in Kremer and Nyborg (2004). This is without loss of practical generality as the pro-rata-
on-the-margin rationing rule is the only rule used in practice (Kastl, 2012). In Appendix A, I
1Because I have assumed βbi (q) to be right-continuous, the max-operator is properly defined. By this assump-
tion, the max-operator is properly defined in the following construction of S−1i and pc as well.
6
discuss the pro-rata-on-the-margin rationing rule and the random rationing rule in some more
detail.
2.3 Interim Utility
The payoff ui that bidder i of type vi ∈ V receives when bids b = (bi , b−i)∈ Bn are submitted
is given by
ui(bi , b−i , vi) =
∫ 1
0
∫ qci
0

vi(q)−βbi (q)

dqdH bi (q
c
i ). (1)
I define µai=1i (bi|vi) = µi(bi|vi) and let µai=0i (bi|vi) put all mass on the set B0 of zero bids.
Because the received quantity for any bidder is unaffected by inactive bidders submitting zero
bids, the function
W ji (q|bi , vi ,µ−i) =
∑
a−i∈{0,1}n−1

1−
∫
V n−1
∫
Bn−1
H bi (q)dµ
a1
1 (b1|v1)...dµai−1i−1 (bi−1|vi−1)×
dµai+1i+1 (bi+1|vi+1)...dµann (bn|vn)dη−i(v−i|vi)

g(a−i|ai = 1)
returns the (decreasing and right-continuous) probability that the received quantity qc for
active bidder i with valuation vi strictly exceeds q ∈ [q j−1i ,q ji ) given the submitted demand
schedule is bi , and the opponent strategy profile is µ−i . This allows me to derive a simple rep-
resentation of the interim utilityΠi(bi , vi ,µ−i) of bidder i having valuation vi when submitting
a bid schedule bi and the opponents following the strategies in strategy profile µ−i .
Lemma 1. The interim utility for bidder i ∈N with valuation vi ∈ V when the opponent strategy
profile is µ−i ∈M n−1 is given by
Πi(bi , vi ,µ−i) =
k∑
j=1
q j∫
q j−1

vi(q)− p ji

W ji (q|bi , vi ,µ−i)dq. (2)
Observe that Lemma 1 does not require assumption (A3). The assumption will be used,
however, both for equilibrium existence and the characterization of the equilibrium, to which
we turn now.
2.4 Equilibrium
I look for equilibria in distributional strategies that I simply call equilibrium in the following.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium). A strategy profile µ is called an equilibrium iff
µi ∈ arg max
µ˜i∈M
∫
V×B
Πi(bi , vi ,µ−i)dµ˜i
holds for all bidders i = 1,...,n.
Combining the existence argument in Milgrom and Weber (1985) for a discrete action
space and the arguments developed in Reny (1999) establishing conditions for the conver-
gence of sequences of ε-equilibria to an equilibrium, I arrive at the following existence result.
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Proposition 1. Assume (A1)–(A2) and a rationing rule complying with (A3). An equilibrium
exists.
I now turn to the characterization of the equilibrium bid-schedules. For a submitted op-
ponent bid profile b−i ∈ Bn−1, let
Sb−ii (p) = 1−
∑
j∈{1,...,n}\i
β−1b j (p)
be the residual supply function faced by bidder i at a price p> 0, and let the set
Bp,q =

x ∈ Bn−1 : S xi (p)≤ q
	
be the set of opponent bid profiles b−i such that the residual supply Sb−ii (p) at p ∈ (0, p¯] is
weakly below q ∈ [0,1]. Given a strategy profile µ∈M n, I write
Fµ,a−iSi(p) (q|vi) =
∫
V n−1
∫
Bp,q
dµa11 (b1|v1)...dµai−1i−1 (bi−1|vi−1)×
dµai+1i+1 (bi+1|vi+1)...dµann (bn|vn)dη−i(v−i|vi)
for the cumulative distribution function of the stochastic residual supply Si(p) ∈ (−∞,1]
faced by bidder i with valuation vi at price p > 0 when the realized participation profile is
a−i ∈ {0,1}n−1 and the other bidders play according to their strategies in the strategy profile
µ∈M n. I let µ∗ denote an equilibrium, and define
W ∗i (p,q|vi) = 1−
∑
x∈{0,1}n−1
Fµ
∗,x
Si(p)
(q|vi)g(x |ai = 1) (3)
as the probability that the residual supply faced by bidder i in equilibrium µ∗ at price p is
strictly higher than q conditional on having valuation vi . Further, I let the function w
∗
i : [0, p]×
[0,1]×V →R+ satisfy
w∗i (p,q|vi) =
∑
x∈{0,1}n−1
f µ
∗,x
Si(p)
(q|vi)g(x |ai = 1) (4)
whenever the density f µ
∗,x
Si(p)
(q|vi) of Fµ∗,xSi(p)(q|vi) exists for all x ∈ {0,1}n−1. Note that because,
for any x ∈ {0,1}n−1 and given vi ∈ V , the density f µ∗,xSi(p)(q|vi) exists for a.e. (p,q) ∈ [0, p]×
[0,1], the function w∗i is equal to the sum appearing on the right-hand side in (4) a.e. on
[0, p]×[0,1].
Because the action space is restricted to decreasing p ji and increasing q
j
i , bidders might
submit less than the allowed number k of price-quantity pairs. A bidder for whom at least one
of the restrictions binds submits a bid-schedule with either p ji = p
j+1
i , or q
j
i = q
j−1
i , or both, for
at least one j ∈ {1,...,k}. I say that the bid-schedule of bidder i consists of `i distinguishable
price-quantity pairs with p ji > p
j+1
i and q
j
i > q
j−1
i , j = 1,...,`i , where I have deleted the price-
quantity pairs from the original bid-schedule for which equality holds either for the quantities,
the prices, or both.
The next proposition follows from the optimality conditions with respect to the submitted
quantities and with respect to the submitted prices of player i and from the observation made
in the proof to Proposition 1 that ties happen with probability zero in equilibrium. Let q0i = 0
and (p`i+1i ,q
`i+1
i ) = (0,1), then
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Proposition 2. In equilibrium µ∗ ∈M n, it holds for all bidders i ∈ {1,...,n}, all steps j ∈
{1,...,`i} and a.e. type vi ∈ V that the distribution of Si(p ji ) is continuous in q ∈ [q j−1i ,q ji ] and
that the distinguishable price-quantity pairs p ji ,q
j
i > 0 satisfy
vi

q ji
− p ji W ∗i (p ji ,q ji |vi)−vi q ji − p j+1i W ∗i (p j+1i ,q ji |vi)≥ 0 (5)∫ q ji
q j−1i

vi(q)− p ji

w∗i (p
j
i ,q|vi)−W ∗i (p ji ,q|vi)

dq≥ 0, (6)
where (5) holds with equality iff q ji < 1 and (6) holds with equality iff p
j
i < p.
Equation (5) follows from the optimality conditions with respect to the quantity points
submitted, and equation (6) follows from the optimality conditions with respect to the price
points submitted. Equation (6) relies on the fact that the equilibrium distribution of Si(p
j
i ) is
continuous on (q j−1i ,q
j
i ] for all i ∈ {1,...,n} and j ∈ {1,...,`i}, which is a direct consequence of
the absence of ties in equilibrium.
While the optimality conditions with respect to quantities are also used in the character-
ization of Kastl (2012), the optimality conditions with respect to prices are not used in Kastl
(2012). Hence, Proposition 2 extends the equilibrium characterization of Kastl (2012), and
it is precisely this additional structure that I am going to exploit for the formulation of the
bounds and the estimator of the number of best-response violations. Furthermore, the inter-
pretation of the equilibrium share winning probability W ∗i in terms of the distribution of the
residual supply function Si(p) will be crucial for the estimation.
In view of the empirical analysis to come, I conclude this section by considering the impli-
cations of two additional assumptions about the type space which will be fruitfully employed.
Definition 2 (Bidder independence). Bidders i ∈ M ⊂ {1,...,n} are called independent if both
ai ∈ {0,1} and vi ∈ V are independently distributed across all bidders i ∈M.
Definition 3 (Bidder Symmetry). Bidders i ∈ M ⊂ {1,...,n} are called symmetric if all bidders
i ∈M have the same marginal density η of valuations vi and the same probability of being active
p = P(ai = 1).
Suppose the set {1,...n} of independent bidders can be partitioned into m≤ n sets M j ,
j =1,...,m of symmetric bidders with n j = |M j|with participation probability p j . I write hi j(x)
for the probability that a bidder from set Mi is faced with 0≤ x ≤ n j opponent bidders from
set M j . For i 6= j, we have
hi j(x) =

n j
x

pxj (1− p j)n j−x ,
and for i = j, we have
hii(x) =

ni−1
x

pxi (1− pi)ni−1−x .
Further, I denote by Fµ
∗,(x1,...xm)
Si(p)
(q) the cumulative distribution function of the residual supply
Si(p) faced by bidder i in equilibrium µ∗ given that he is faced with x j opponent bidders from
set M j , j = 1,...,m. Observe that because the bidders’ valuations are independent, F
µ∗,(x1,...xm)
Si(p)
does not depend on bidder i’s valuation vi and consequently neither do W
∗
i and w
∗
i . Hence, I
get
Lemma 2. Assume that all bidders i ∈{1,...,n} are independent, that {M1, ..., Mm} is a partition
of the bidder set into m≤ n sets of symmetric bidders, and that bidder i is in set M j . Then, W ∗i
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is independent of vi and can be expressed as
W ∗i (q, p) = 1−
n1∑
x1=0
n2∑
x2=0
. . .
n j−1∑
x j=0
. . .
nm∑
xm=0
hi1(x1)× . . .×him(nm)Fµ∗,(x1,...xm)Si(p) (q), (7)
whereas w∗i , too, is independent of vi and satisfies
w∗i (q, p) =
n1∑
x1=0
n2∑
x2=0
. . .
n j−1∑
x j=0
. . .
nm∑
xm=0
hi1(x1)× . . .×him(nm) f µ∗,(n1,...nm)Si(p) (q) (8)
whenever the density f µ
∗,(x1,...xm)
Si(p)
(q) of Fµ
∗,(x1,...xm)
Si(p)
(q) exists for all x j ≤ n j and all j = 1,...,m.
3 Bounds
This section presents an upper and a lower bound on the valuations that satisfy the charac-
terization (6) in Proposition 2. To do so, I employ the following additional assumption on the
type space that holds throughout the rest of the paper.
(A4) All bidders i ∈ {1,...,n} are independent.
As seen above, it follows from Assumption (A4) that both W ∗i and w∗i are independent of vi
for any bidder i. For a bidder i and a step j ∈ {1,...,`i}, let V ji be the set of non-increasing
functions v ji : [q
j−1
i ,q
j
i ]→ [0, v¯], and denote by
V j0 ≡
(
vi ∈ V ji :
∫ q ji
q j−1i

vi(q)− p ji

w∗i (p
j
i ,q)−W ∗i (p ji ,q)

dq = 0
)
(9)
the set of marginal valuation functions satisfying the optimality conditions (6) on the respec-
tive interval [q j−1i ,q
j
i ] for p
j
i ∈ (0, p¯). For the following, I employ the pointwise partial order
on the set V ji .
Definition 4 (Order on V ji ). Let vi , v˜i ∈ V ji . We have vi ≥ v˜i iff vi(q)≥ v˜i(q), ∀q ∈ [q j−1i ,q ji ].
The aim of the following is to characterize functions that lie weakly above the least upper
bound v j0 =∨(V j0 ) and weakly below the greatest lower bound v j0 =∧(V j0 ) of the set V j0 . I con-
struct such functions as a fixed point of an auxiliary function on V ji ×V ji that in turn requires
knowledge of two functions lying above v j0 and below v
j
0. While I assume knowledge of such
functions in the derivation below, I will present an empirical strategy of finding such functions
later on.
Let ω j : [q j−1i ,q
j
i ]→R+ be a non-increasing function satisfying ω j(q)≥ v0(q) for all q ∈
[q j−1i ,q
j
i ], and let ω
j : [q j−1i ,q
j
i ]→R+ be a non-increasing function satisfying ω j(q)≤ v0(q)
for all q ∈ [q j−1i ,q ji ]. For q ∈ [q j−1i ,q ji ], v ∈ [0, v] and v ju, v jl ∈ V ji , j ∈ {1,...,`i}, I define
µu(q, v, v
j
l ) =
∫ q
q j−1i

max
¦
v, v jl (x)
©− p ji w∗i (p ji , x)−W ∗i (p ji , x)dx
+
∫ q ji
q

v jl (x)− p ji

w∗i (x , p
j
i )−W ∗i (p ji , x)

dx (10)
10
and
µl(q, v, v
j
u) =
∫ q
q j−1i

v ju(x)− p ji

w∗i (p
j
i , x)−W ∗i (p ji , x)

dx
+
∫ q ji
q

min

v, v ju(x)
	− p ji w∗i (p ji , x)−W ∗i (p ji , x)dx . (11)
Clearly, both µu and µl are continuously decreasing in v. Using (10)–(11), I let the pair of
functions (gu, gv) with gu : V
j
i → V ji and gl : V ji → V ji be given for q ∈ [q j−1i ,q ji ] as
gu(v
j
l )(q) =

ω j(q) if µu(q,ω j(q), v
j
l )> 0
ω j(q) if µu(q,ω
j(q), v jl )< 0
min{v ∈ [ω j(q˜),ω j(q˜)] :µu(q, v, v jl )≥ 0} else
(12)
and
gl(v
j
u)(q) =

ω j(q) if µl(q,ω j(q), v
j
u)> 0
ω j(q) if µl(q,ω
j(q), v ju)< 0
max{v ∈ [ω j(q˜),ω j(q˜)] :µl(q, v, v ju)≤ 0} else
. (13)
The function gu returns for any given v
l
j ∈ V ji a function in V ji that returns at any q ∈ [q j−1i ,q ji ]
the highest point such that there is a lowest non-increasing function going through that point
that still satisfies the characterization (6) and is higher than v lj . Conversely, the function gl
returns for any given vuj ∈ V ji a function in V ji that returns at any q ∈ [q j−1i ,q ji ] the lowest point
such that there is a highest non-increasing function going through that point that still satisfies
the characterization (6) and is lower than vuj .
One would suspect that mutually consistent such functions form upper and lower bounds
on the set V j0 . The following paragraphs show that this intuition is indeed correct. Let v
j
lu =
(v jl , v
j
u)∈ V ji ×V ji and g = (gu, gl), and consider the set of fixed points
Φ(g)≡ ¦v ∈ V ji ×V ji : v = g(v)© . (14)
I start by establishing that the set Φ(g) is a complete lattice when we put the following partial
order on the set V ji ×V ji .
Definition 5 (Order on V ji ×V ji ). Let v jlu, v˜ jlu ∈ V ji ×V ji . We have v jlu ≥ v˜ jlu iff both v ju ≤ v˜ ju and
v jl ≥ v˜ jl hold.
Lemma 3. The set Φ(g) is a complete lattice.
The proof to Lemma 3 relies on the Knaster-Tarski fixed point theorem. By Lemma 3,
there exist, for any bidder i and step j ∈ {1,...,`i}, a least v jlu solving v jlu = g(v jlu). The next
proposition states that this least fixed point is below the least upper and greatest lower bounds
of V j0 , as depicted in Figure 1.
Proposition 3. It holds that ∧(Φ(q))≤ (v j0, v j0).
Knowing that the set Φ(q) has a least fixed-point suggests a numerical strategy to find that
least fixed point by a simple iteration procedure of g that has (ω j ,ω j) as initial condition. In
Section 5, I present such a fixed point iteration algorithm and in Section 6 I discuss strategies
to derive feasible initial conditions (ω j ,ω j).
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qb,v(q)
b1i
b2i
b3i
b4i
q1i q
2
i q
3
i q
4
i 1q˜1q˜2
Bid-function βi(q)
Upper: ω3; Lower: ω3
Least fixed point v3ul =∧(Φ(g))
vˆ: valuation within bounds.
v˜: valuation within bounds.
Least upper and greatest lower bound of the set V 30 .
Figure 1: The figure depicts in black a bid-function βi(q) for bidder i with four steps, and in
dotted red the least fixed point v3lu =∧(Φ(g)) for step j=3, whereΦ is given in (14). The functions
v3lu are lower and upper bounds of V
3
0 whose upper and lower bounds are depicted in dashed gray.
The valuation function vˆ (v˜) is the lowest (highest) non-increasing valuation functions that is
equal to v3l (q) for q > q˜1 (q ≤ q˜2) and for which the right-hand side of (6) is greater (lower)
zero. By the construction of gu, gl as given in (12) and (13), vˆ (resp. v˜) satisfies vˆ(q˜1) = v3u (q˜1)
(resp. v˜(q˜2) = v3l (q˜2)).
4 Estimation and Consistency
I now turn to the estimation of W ∗i and w∗i . I assume that the data at hand covers a series of
auctions t =1,..., T with nt ≥2 participating bidders in auction t. The submitted bid-schedules
are collected in the set B with cardinality |B|=∑Tt=1 nt . Potential bidders have to register
prior to bidding, and the number of potential bidders is N ≥min{n1, ...,nt}. Throughout the
following I make the following assumptions on the data generating process in addition to
(A1)-(A2) and (A4).
(A5) All bidders i ∈ {1,...,N} are symmetric. In particular it holds for all bidders that the
probability to participate is p = P(ai = 1).
(A6) All auctions t ∈ {1,..., T} are identical, that is, the valuation and participation distribu-
tions are identical across all auctions.
Assumptions (A5) and (A6) can be weakened: Assumption (A5) can be weakened to assuming
that there are subsets of symmetric agents, and Assumption (A6) can be weakened to assuming
that there are subsets of comparable auctions. For the sake of expositional clarity I focus on
the simplest case in which both Assumptions (A5) and (A6) hold. Nevertheless I discuss
possibilities to weaken (A5)–(A6) as we go along, and in the application in Section 6 I assess
several of these possibilities.
4.1 Two simple estimators
As all bidders are symmetric and independent and all auctions are identical, every bidder i
is faced with the same distribution of the residual supply function function in every auction
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that he is active. Hence, dropping the subscript i in the following, we have by Lemma 2, for
a.e. (p,q)∈ (0, p)×(0,1),
w∗(p,q) =
N−1∑
n=0
f µ
∗,n
S(p) (q)h(n). (15)
The right-hand side of (15) consists of the sum of the densities f nS(p) of the value of the residual
supply function S(p) at q given that the bidder at hand faces n opponents, that are weighted
by the probability h(n) of having exactly n opponents. The probability h(n) that a bidder is
faced with 0≤ n≤ N −1 opponent bidders in an auction can be estimated by
hˆ(n) =

N −1
n

pˆn(1− pˆ)N−1−n, (16)
where pˆ is an estimate of the parameter p obtained by
pˆ =
1
T
T∑
t=1
nt
N
. (17)
On the other hand, the density f µ
∗,n
S(p) (q) is estimated with
fˆ µ
∗,n
S(p) (q) =
1
|B|n
∑
β1∈B
· · · ∑
βn∈B
Kb
 
n∑
j=1
β−1j (p)−q
!
where Kb(.) stands for an arbitrary kernel with bandwidth b> 0 and we have fˆ
µ∗,0
S(p) (q)= 0 for
all q ∈ (0,1) and p ∈ (0, p¯) by definition. Taken together, I define
wˆ∗(p,q) =
N−1∑
n=0
fˆ µ
∗,n
S(p) (q)hˆ(n) (18)
for all (p,q)∈ (0, p)×(0,1). As regards the cumulative distribution of the received quantity, I
also skip the subscript referring to bidder i and write
W ∗(p,q) = 1−
N−1∑
n=0
Fµ
∗,n
Si(p)
(q)h(n).
In order to estimate W ∗(q, b), I use hˆ(n) as in (16) above to estimate h(n), and estimate
Fµ
∗,n
Si(p)
(q) with
Fˆµ
∗,n
S(p) (q) =
1
|B|n
∑
β1∈B
· · · ∑
βn∈B
1
(
n∑
j=1
β−1j (p)≥ 1−q
)
,
with Fˆµ
∗,0
S(p) (q) = 0 for all q ∈ (0,1) and p ∈ (0, p¯) by definition. Taken together, we have
Wˆ ∗(p,q) = 1−
N−1∑
n=0
Fˆµ
∗,n
S(p) (q)hˆ(n). (19)
As regards consistency of the two estimators (18) and (19) above, first observe that we have
plimT→∞hˆ(n) = h(n) because plimT→∞ pˆ = p by the law of large numbers (cf. van der Vaart,
1998, Chapter 19). Secondly, note that from T→∞, it follows that |B|→∞. Consequently,
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we have plimT→∞ Fˆµ
∗,n
S(p) (q) = F
µ∗,n
S(p) (q) for all q ∈ (0,1) and p ∈ (0, p) and n∈ {1,...,N} again
by the law of large numbers (cf. van der Vaart, 1998, Chapter 19), which together with the
consistency of hˆ(n) gives us consistency of Wˆ ∗.
Furthermore, for any sequence of kernels with bandwidth b→ 0 satisfying b|B|n−1→∞
as |B| →∞ for all n ∈ {1,...,N} it follows for any n ∈ {1,...,N} and for a.e. q ∈ (0,1) and
p ∈ (0, p) that plimT→∞ fˆ nS(p)(q) = f nS(p)(q) whenever f nS(p) is continuous (cf. Parzen, 1962,
Corollary 1A and Theorem 2A), which together with the consistency of hˆ(n) gives us consis-
tency of wˆ∗.2 The next lemma summarizes these findings.
Lemma 4 (Consistency). For all q ∈ (0,1) and p ∈ (0, p), we have
plim
T→∞
Wˆ ∗(p,q) =W ∗(p,q),
and for a.e. q∈ (0,1) and p∈ (0, p) and any sequence of kernels with bandwith limT→∞ b(T )=0
satisfying limT→∞ b(T )|B|n−1 =∞ for all n∈ {1,...,N} we have
plim
T→∞
wˆ∗(p,q) = w∗(p,q).
I refrain from deriving an expression of the asymptotic variance of wˆ∗ and Wˆ ∗, but note
that it can be approximated by drawing bootstrap samples of the original data and running
with these bootstrap samples the resampling procedure as discussed in Section 5 (cf. also
Hortaçsu and McAdams, 2010) .
4.2 Best response violations
Using the assumption of decreasing marginal valuations and combining the characterizations
(5)–(6) from Proposition 2, I obtain the following result.
Lemma 5. In the equilibrium µ∗ of auction t, the submitted price-quantity pairs (p ji ,q
j
i ) satisfy,
for every bidder i = 1,...,nt , a.e. vi ∈ V , and steps j ∈ {1,...,`i−1}
q ji∫
q j−1i
W ∗i (p
j
i ,q)dq
q ji∫
q j−1i
w∗i (p
j
i ,q)dq
W ∗i (p
j
i ,q
j
i )−W ∗i (p j+1i ,q ji )
W ∗i (p
j+1
i ,q
j
i )
≥
p ji − p j+1i ≥
q j+1i∫
q ji
W ∗i (p
j+1
i ,q)dq
q j+1i∫
q ji
w∗i (p
j+1
i ,q)dq
W ∗i (p
j
i ,q
j
i )−W ∗i (p j+1i ,q ji )
W ∗i (p
j
i ,q
j
i )
. (20)
2To be more precise, the unscaled kernel K(x) = bKb(bx) must satisfy supx |K(x)|<∞,
∫ |K(x)|dx <∞,∫
K(x)dx = 1, and limx→∞ |xK(x)|= 0 (cf. Assumptions (1.11)-(1.13) together with Corollary 1A in Parzen,
1962).
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The derivation of above inequalities becomes evident in the following paragraphs. Plug-
ging the estimators wˆ∗i and Wˆ ∗i into the inequalities reported in Lemma 5 above, I define, for
all p ji ∈ (0, p¯) and q ji ∈ (0,1),
θ
j+
i =max

Wˆ ∗i (p
j
i ,q
j
i )−Wˆ ∗i (p j+1i ,q ji )
Wˆ ∗i (p
j
i ,q
j
i )
q j+1i∫
q ji
Wˆ ∗i (p
j+1
i ,q)dq
q j+1i∫
q ji
wˆ∗i (p
j+1
i ,q)dq
−p ji − p j+1i  ,0

and
θ
j−
i =max


p ji − p j+1i
− Wˆ ∗i (p ji ,q ji )−Wˆ ∗i (p j+1i ,q ji )
Wˆ ∗i (p
j+1
i ,q
j
i )
q ji∫
q j−1i
Wˆ ∗i (p
j
i ,q)dq
q ji∫
q j−1i
wˆ∗i (p
j
i ,q)dq
,0

.
Both θ j+i and θ
j−
i detect violations of best response behavior by checking whether the point
estimate of vi(q
j
i ) given by
vˆi(q
j
i ) = p
j
i +

p ji − p j+1i
 Wˆ ∗i (p j+1i ,q ji )
Wˆ ∗i (p
j
i ,q
j
i )−Wˆ ∗i (p j+1i ,q ji )
, (21)
obtained by using the equilibrium bid-schedule characterization (5), lies between the esti-
mated upper bound vˆui (q
j
i ) given by
vˆui (q
j
i ) = p
j
i +

q ji∫
q j−1i
Wˆ ∗i (p
j
i ,q)dq


q ji∫
q j−1i
wˆ∗i (p
j
i ,q)dq

−1
, (22)
and the estimated lower bound vˆ li (q
j
i ) given by
vˆ li (q
j
i ) = p
j+1
i +

q j+1i∫
q ji
Wˆ ∗i (p
j+1
i ,q)dq


q j+1i∫
q ji
wˆ∗i (p
j+1
i ,q)dq

−1
, (23)
where both vˆui (q
j
i ) and vˆ
l
i (q
j
i ) are obtained by using the equilibrium bid-schedule characteriza-
tion (6) and the assumption of decreasing marginal valuations. If θ j+i = θ
j−
i = 0, then the the
hypothesis of best response behavior cannot be rejected, but if either θ j+i or θ
j−
i is non-zero
then we have a violation of best response behavior for price-quantity pair (p ji ,q
j
i ). Observe
that the last step j = `i never violates best response behavior for any bidder i. Aggregation of
θ
j+
i and θ
j−
i for a given auction t is possible in several ways, one of which is given by
Θt =
 nt∑
i=1
`i−1∑
j=1

1{(θ j+i > 0)∨(θ j−i > 0)}
 nt∑
i=1
`i
−1
, (24)
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where ∨ denotes logical disjunction. Θt ∈ [0,1] estimates the fraction of violations of the
inequalities stated in Lemma 5 in the submitted price-quantity pairs for a given auction t.
The interpretation of Θt is intuitive: Because the inequalities given in Lemma 5 are necessary
for best response behavior, Θt returns a lower bound on the fraction of price-quantity pairs
that violate best response behavior given that we can consistently estimate the equilibrium
distribution of Si(p) for any bidder i.
This allows for a comparison either between the degree of irrationality in different auctions
or between the quality of different estimators of W ∗i and w∗i : If we are confident enough that
the estimates of W ∗i and w∗i are accurate, then the values of Θt can be interpreted as the
degree at which the bidders violate their best responses. So, if we have a series of auctions t,
then changes in the values of Θt in these auctions might be taken as an indicator for whether
the bidders learn to play best response over time or not. If, on the other hand, we are not
confident that the estimates of W ∗i and w∗i are accurate, then we may take the value of Θt
as an indicator for how many best-response violations we have to allow for when using wˆ∗i
and Wˆ ∗i . That is, we can take Θt as an indicator for the accuracy of the assumptions that the
estimators of W ∗i and w∗i make on the type space. Comparing different type space assumptions
by means of the corresponding values of Θt thus yields an ordering for the validity of these
assumptions based on the degree of irrationality that has to be assumed so that the data is
consistent with the model.
In the application in Section 6 below, I follow the second possibility. Again, I refrain from
deriving an analytical expression for the variance of Θt but note that it can be computed by
standard bootstrap methods as discussed e.g. in Hortaçsu and McAdams (2010).
5 Implementation
5.1 Estimating W ∗i and w∗i
A direct calculation of wˆ∗(q, p) or Wˆ ∗(q, p) is unfeasible already for a small number |B| of
bid functions. For this reason, I employ a resampling procedure to approximate both wˆ∗(q, p)
and Wˆ ∗(q, p). The procedure repeatedly draws at random from the set B of available bid-
functions a sample whose size is binomially distributed with parameters N−1 and pˆ and then
constructs the resulting residual supply function. This yields a set of residual supply functions
from which the distribution of the residual supply S(p) at the prices p∈ (0, p¯) of interest can be
estimated. The details are given in Algorithm 1: The number of resampled supply functions
is denoted by R> 0 (where R is chosen sufficiently large), the set of bid schedules is B , the
list of the number nt of participants in the auctions t = 1,..., T is {nt}t=1,...,T , and the total
number of registered bidders is N .
Algorithm 1 Resampling Wˆ ∗ and wˆ∗
Require: R,B ,N ,{nt}t=1,...,T .
1: Estimate p with pˆ = T−1
∑T
t=1 nt/N .
2: r← 1
3: for r = 1 to R do
4: Draw the number of opponent bidders n∼ B(N −1, pˆ)
5: Randomly draw a set of n bid functions β fromB with replacement.
6: Compute the residual supply function Sr(p) = 1−∑n−1i=1 β−1i (p).
7: end for
8: return wˆ∗,R(q, p) = R−1
∑R
r=1 Kh (Sr(p)−q) and Wˆ ∗,R(q, p) = R−1
∑R
r=11{Sr(p)≥ q}
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Algorithm 1 is inspired by the resampling procedures used in Hortaçsu and McAdams
(2010) and Kastl (2011), but differs from these in two important respects: First, both Hor-
taçsu and McAdams (2010) and Kastl (2011) assume fixed participation while Algorithm 1 in-
corporates random participation. Second, both algorithms in Hortaçsu and McAdams (2010)
and Kastl (2011) compute the empirical distribution function of the quantity received qc for a
given sample of bid-schedules conditional on a bid-schedule bi whereas Algorithm 1 returns
estimates of the distribution of the residual supply function S(p) faced by the bidders.
As R grows large, the resampling estimator wˆ∗,R approaches wˆ∗ and the resampling esti-
mator Wˆ ∗,R approaches Wˆ ∗ (see Kastl, 2011, for a discussion). As long as R and T are finite
however, the resampling estimators wˆ∗,R and Wˆ ∗,R will have non-zero variance. The variance
in the resampling estimators comes from two sources: First, there is an error with respect to
the approximated estimators wˆ∗ and Wˆ ∗, and, second, there is an error stemming from the fact
that wˆ∗ and Wˆ ∗ themselves have non-zero variance. Because we are not directly interested
in wˆ∗ and Wˆ ∗, however, I will not report these variances. Rather, I will follow the general
approach in the literature to report the bootstrap confidence intervals for the estimators of
interest that use wˆ∗ and Wˆ ∗ – which are the estimator of Θt and that of the least fixed point of
g. The confidence bands are calculated by rerunning the resampling algorithm on bootstrap
bid-function samples of the original sample (cf. Hortaçsu and McAdams, 2010; Kastl, 2011)
and reporting the respective quantiles of the estimates thus obtained.
Algorithm 1 can be modified such as to accommodate for the assumption that there are
subsets of auctions with symmetrical type spaces, in which case we would restrict the set B
of bid-schedules to the respective subset when approximating Wˆ ∗i and wˆ∗i for a bidder in that
subset. Furthermore, drawing from the different subsets according to a distribution that is
estimated based on observable covariates of the auctions in the subsets, along the lines in
Hortaçsu and McAdams (2010), would be straightforward to implement. Last, the algorithm
could also accommodate the assumption that the set of bidders is partitioned into subsets of
symmetrical bidders, in which case it would first estimate the participation probability for the
bidders in the respective subsets, and then construct approximations of Wˆ ∗i and wˆ∗i separately
for the bidders in the respective subsets.
5.2 Computing the Bounds
It remains to present the algorithm to compute the fixed point of g. For a given step j ∈
{1,...,`i}, I partition the line segment [q j−1i ,q ji ] into hq > 0 steps and denote the partition by
Q =
¨
q j−1i ,q
j−1
i +
q ji −q j−1i
hq
,q j−1i +2
q ji −q j−1i
hq
, ...,q ji
«
, (25)
with the j-th element denoted by (Q) j . I define step-functions v˜l(., j, x ,w) and v˜u(., j, x ,w)
for x ∈ [q j−1i ,q ji ], j ∈ {1,...,hq +1}, and w∈ V ji on [q j−1i ,q ji ] given by
vu(q, j, x ,w) =
hq∑
i=1
vu,i ·1{q ∈ [(Q)i ,(Q)i+1)},
with v˜u,i =
¨
max{x ,w((Q)i) for i≤ j
w((Q)i) for i> j , (26)
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and by
vl(q, j, x ,w) =
hq∑
i=1
vl,i ·1{q ∈ [(Q)i ,(Q)i+1)},
with v˜l,i =
¨
w((Q)i) for i≤ j
min{x ,w((Q)i)} for i> j . (27)
Plugin in (26) and (27) into
Φ(v) =
q j+1i∫
qi

v(q)− p ji

wˆ∗,R(p ji ,q)−Wˆ ∗,R(p ji ,q)

jdq, (28)
then gives me the discrete analogue to the functions µu and µl given in (10) and (11), respec-
tively.
The procedure to iterate the fixed point of g for step j ∈ {1,...,`i} of bidder i with bid-
schedule bi is described with Algorithm 2. The algorithm requires the number of steps hq, the
partition Q, and a pair of functions (ω j ,ω j) that satisfy ω j > v j0 and ω j < v j0. The algorithm
then iterates (gl , gu) starting with arguments (u1, l1) = (ω
j ,ω j) and constructing sequences
lr ∈ V ji and ur ∈ V ji , r = 2,... until the sum of differences in the respective function values
between two iterations r and r+1 under the sup-norm is lower than some pre-specified ε>
0.3 The algorithm hinges crucially on the fact that the initial conditions (ω j ,ω j) indeed satisfy
ω j > v j0 and ω
j < v j0. I discuss the derivation of such initial conditions in the application to
which we turn next.
6 Application: Swiss Meat Import Rights Auctions
The aim of this section is to give proofs of concept both for the estimator of the share of
best response violations and for the algorithm to construct bounds on the bidders’ valuations
between the submitted quantities. I do so by looking at data from high-quality beef (HQB)
import quota auctions to Switzerland in which bidders compete for the right to import a fixed,
divisible quantity of high-quality beef at a low tariff.
6.1 Data: Swiss High-Quality Beef Import Quota Auctions
Meat imports to Switzerland are subject to a two-part tariff: for each of the different meat
categories that the meat market is segmented in there is a monthly or quarterly quota that
the market participants are allowed to import at a low in-quota tariff. Once the quota is filled
unlimited additional meat can be imported at a considerably higher out-of-quota tariff. From
2008 – 2015, the entire quotas in any of the categories were allocated through discriminatory
share auctions; in 2015, the share of the respective quotas that are allocated by auction was
reduced to 50%.4
3An alternative to the iteration procedure in Algorithm 2 is, of course, to directly iterate the composite function
g l ◦ gu with initial conditionω j . This will yield the lowest v jl for which it holds that v jl = g l(gu(v jl )), which then in
turn allows to compute the highest v ju for which it holds that v
j
u = g
u(g l(v ju)) by evaluating g
u(v jl ). I have chosen
the formulation in Algorithm 2 because it I believe that it is notationally more transparent.
4This was due to pressure from agricultural and meat processing lobbying groups. The remaining quota is
since allocated on the basis of domestic purchase, which is the allocation mechanism used before 2008.
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Algorithm 2 Computing the bounds
Require: ε, hq, Q, ω j ,ω j
1: r← 0
2: u1←ω j
3: l1←ω j
4: repeat
5: r← r+1
6: for j = 1 to hq do
7: lr+1, j←

ω j((Q) j) if Φ(vl(q, j,ω j((Q) j),ur))> 0
ω j((Q) j) if Φ(vl(q, j,ω j((Q) j),ur))< 0
min

x ∈ [ω j((Q) j),ω j((Q) j)] :
Φ(vl(., j, x ,ur))≤ 0} else
8: ur+1, j←

ω j((Q) j) if Φ(vl(., j,ω j((Q) j),ur))> 0
ω j((Q) j) if Φ(vl(., j,ω j((Q) j),ur))< 0
max

x ∈ [ω j((Q) j),ω j((Q) j)] :
Φ(vu(., j, x ,ur))≥ 0} else
9: end for
10: lr+1(q)←∑hqi=1 lr+1,i ·1{q ∈ [(Q)i ,(Q)i+1)}, q ∈ [q j−1i ,q ji ]
11: ur+1(q)←∑hqi=1 ur+1,i ·1{q ∈ [(Q)i ,(Q)i+1)}, q ∈ [q j−1i ,q ji ]
12: until supq∈[q ji ,q j+1i ] |lr(q)− lr+1(q)|+supq∈[q ji ,q j+1i ] |ur(q)−ur+1(q)| ≤ ε
13: return lr+1,ur+1
For each meat category, online-auctions are conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture. In
general the quotas vary over time. The quotas are set and announced prior to the auction by
the Ministry of Agriculture that usually follows the recommendation of the trade association
of Swiss meat producers (proviande).5 Bidding is open to all residents of Switzerland, but
a registration at the Ministry of Agriculture is required. After every auction, the Ministry of
Agriculture publishes quantities received and prices paid by every bidder. Import rights are
valid until the next auction takes place.
I focus on the import quota auctions of high-quality beef (HQB). Auctions in this category
take place roughly monthly, and bidders are allowed submit at most 5 price-quantity bids. The
data set at hand covers 39 auctions from 2008 to 2010 with a total of 123 registered bidders.
For every auction, the data contain the quota and the price-quantity bids of the active bidders.
The quotas range from 67.5 tons to 630 tons per auction with a mean quota of 311.5 tons.
Auction revenues per kg range from CHF 4.88 to CHF 14.79 with a mean of CHF 8.91 per
kilogram. Absolute revenues per auction range from CHF 661,000 to CHF 7,984,000 with a
mean revenue per auction of CHF 2,763,000. The accumulated revenue over the 39 auctions
from 2008 to 2010 at hand amounts to CHF 107 million.
The number of active bidders varies between 58 and 82. The average number of active
bidders in an auction is 70. The average share of successful bidders (that is of bidders having
received a non-zero share) is 64% per auction. The lowest ratio between successful and active
participants lies at 3 to 68, the highest ratio at 76 to 78. Stop-out prices range from CHF 3.21
per kg to CHF 14.41 per kilogram. The shares of the total quota allocated to a single bidder
5This is officially justified on the grounds that the trade association has superior information about market
conditions and can absorb systematic shocks to the market best by setting an appropriate quantity. The estimates
in the following suggests that this assertion has to be taken with a grain of salt.
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Min Avg Max
Number of bidders 58 70 82
Share of successful bidders 3/68 65% 76/78
Quota, tons 67.6 311.5 630
Share of quota allocated to single bidder 0.0001 0.014 0.47
Clearing price, CHF/kg 3.21 8.22 14.41
Total revenue, CHF 0.6 mio. 2.763 mio. 7.984 mio.
Table 1: Summary of Auction Characteristics. The total number of registered bidders is 123, the
total revenue over the 39 auctions from 2008 to 2010 considered is CHF 107 mio.
range from a minimum of 0.0001 to a maximum of 0.47. Table 1 summarizes these auction
characteristics.
6.2 Estimating w∗i and W ∗i
I assume the total number of potential bidders to be the number of registered bidders, that is,
we have N = 123. I apply Algorithm 1 under the assumption that all bidders are symmetric in
a given auction, but that bidders are not necessarily symmetric across the different auctions.
I distinguish three scenarios:
(S1) All auctions are identical. This scenario presumes that the game faced by the bidders
is the same in all auctions. Such might for example come about if the auctioneer can
fully accommodate systematic shocks that the bidders are faced in the meat market by
appropriately setting the quota. Under this scenario, the algorithm to compute w∗i and
W ∗i samples from the full set of bid-functions available. Analogously, the participation
probability is computed by using the full set of auction.
(S2) Neither of the auctions are identical. This scenario presumes that the game faced by the
bidders changes with every auction. Such might be reasonable to assume if we believe
that the auctioneer cannot accommodate for systematic shocks through the quota. Un-
der this scenario, only the bid-functions submitted for the particular auction are consid-
ered, and the participation probability is computed by only using the particular auction.
(S3) Each auction is sufficiently similar to the two preceding and the two following auctions. This
scenario presumes that the game faced by the bidders changes slowly over the course of
the auctions. Such might be the case if the shocks that the bidders are faced with have
a common component that changes over time and the auctioneer cannot accommodate
for these shocks. As a consequence, only bid-functions from auctions lying close by are
to be taken for resampling S(p). Analogously, the participation probability is computed
by only using auctions lying close by.
Neither of the scenarios (S1)–(S3) is a priori unreasonable, and without a further theoretical
or empirical selection criterion it is hard to assess their respective plausibility. The next section
discusses in what sense the estimator Θt of the fraction of best response violation is a natural
candidate for a such selection criterion among the potential scenarios.6
6Indeed, the set of possible scenarios is infinite. The point with this section is to show that already for these
three simple scenarios, the estimated fraction of best response violation differ considerably.
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Figure 2: The figure depicts 50 redraws of the residual supply function S(p) under scenario (S2)
in blue, an estimate of the density of S(p) at p = 6250 in green, and an estimate of the c.d.f. of
S(p) at p = 7000 in red.
The prices in the price-quantity bids are in CHF per ton, and the quantities are in tons. In
order to estimate w∗i and W ∗i for the bidders i in a given auction, I normalize the price-quantity
bids of the other auctions from which I draw bid-schedules from to the quota of the auction
under consideration. That is, if the quota in the auction t under consideration is Q and that
of the auction t ′ is Q′, then, when drawing a bid-schedule from auction t ′, I multiply each
quantity q ji in that bid-schedule by Q/Q
′ and each price p ji by Q′/Q.
Figure 2 shows the result of Algorithm 1 by depicting in blue 50 redraws of the residual
supply function S(p) under scenario (S2). From these residual supply functions I have com-
puted an estimate of the cumulative distribution function of S(p) for p = 6250 in red, and an
estimate of the density of S(p) for p=7000 in green, respectively. Whenever we have a bidder
i such that there is j ∈ {1,...,`i} and p ji = 7000, then we know from Proposition 2 and Lemma
2 that we can use these estimates as estimates for w∗i (p
j
i ,q) whenever q ∈ (q j−1i ,q ji ). In a sim-
ilar manner, the estimate of the cumulative distribution function of S(p) at p = 6250 can be
taken as estimator of Wi(p
j
i ,q) on q∈ (q j−1i ,q ji ) for any bidder i such that there is j ∈ {1,...,`i}
and p ji = 6250.
6.3 Best response violations
Figure 3 depicts estimates and 95% confidence intervals of Θt for t = 15,...,30 as defined in
(24) under the different scenarios (S1)–(S3). The figure suggests that there are systematic and
significant differences in the estimates between the scenarios (S1)-(S3): In all but auctions
t = 24 and t = 26 the confidence intervals of the estimates for scenario (S1) and (S2) do
not overlap, and the estimates for scenario (S1) are for all these auctions higher than those
for scenario (S2). Furthermore, the differences are substantial: If we want to assume that
scenario (S1) is valid, then we have to be ready to assume that the fraction of best response
violations among the submitted bids is 0.75 or higher with a probability of 90% in eleven
out of the 16 auctions under consideration. On the other hand, we see that for eleven out
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Figure 3: Estimates of Θt for auctions t = 15,...,30 under the different type space scenarios.
Estimates and 90% confidence bands computed by using 100 bootstrap samples.
of 16 auctions the fraction of violations lies below 0.5 at a 90% confidence level when we
treat all auctions as distinct (i.e. scenario (S2)). For scenario (S3), we get a more mixed
picture. Nevertheless, the estimates for scenario (S3) seem to systematically lie between those
obtained under scenario (S1) and (S2) – which is not surprising given the fact that scenario
(S3) makes less assumptions on the comparability of the different auctions than scenario (S1)
but more than scenario (S2).
The findings suggest that the particular type space assumption has a great impact on the
plausibility of the estimates. Of course, a thorough check of the type space would also include
checking scenarios with subsets of independent and ex ante symmetric bidders that are not
symmetric across sets. If so, Algorithm 1 would have to be adapted as discussed above in
Section 5.2.
6.4 Computing the Bounds
We now turn to the estimation of the bounds on marginal valuations with Algorithm 2. Al-
gorithm 2 requires to specify the lower and upper bounds ω j and ω j on the set of valuation
function on which the map g is iterated. A natural candidate for the lower bound is the lower
bound obtained on the valuation vi(q) evaluated at the jth quantity point, i.e. at q = q
j
i as in
(23). That is, for bidder i and step j ∈ {1,...`i}, I set
ω j =min
¦
p ji , vˆ
l
i (q
j
i )
©
, (29)
where I take into account that bidding below one’s valuation is dominated (see the proof to
Proposition 1). As regards the upper bound ω j for bidder i and step j ∈ {2,...`i}, I resort to
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Figure 4: The result of Algorithm 2 under Scenario (S2) for Bidder 5 in Auction 20. The chosen
error was ε = 0.0001 and the intervals [q ji ,q
j+1
i ], j ∈ {1,...,`i −1} were divided into 10 seg-
ments each. Confidence bands depict pointwise 95% confidence intervals for the bounds and were
computed by estimating the bounds for 50 bootstrap samples of the original data.
the bound (22) and set7
ω j = vˆui (q
j−1
i ). (30)
For the first step j =1 there is no such upper bound available. Because I do not want to assume
anything about the upper bound v on the type space, I run the algorithm withω j =∞ which
essentially amounts to running one iteration of g. For any finite hq > 0, this procedure yields
a strictly bounded upper bound, while returning the initial condition for the lower bound .
As an example, the resulting bounds from Algorithm 2 for bidder 5 in Auction 20 under
scenario (S3) are depicted in Figure 4.8 Drawn in red is the bid-schedule submitted by the
bidder. The blue graph depicts the estimate of the upper bound with pointwise 90% confi-
dence bands in shaded blue. Conversely, the green graph shows the estimate of the lower
bound with pointwise 90% confidence bands in shaded green.
Figure 5 depicts the gains in lower bounds on the estimates of the total ex post bidder
rent in the auctions t =15,...,30 (i.e. aggregated ex post valuations of the received quantities
minus the payments) when using the Algorithm 2 rather than the estimates obtained when
merely using the initial conditions used for the algorithm. The estimates were obtained under
scenario (S2) For example, a number of five means that the difference between the estimate
when using the algorithm and that when merely using the initial conditions is five percent of
the estimate when using the initial conditions. The gains are strictly greater than zero at the
7Alternatively, the point estimates of the marginal valuation at the submitted quantities obtained with (21)
could have been used. Although this would yield even tighter initial conditions, this only yields sensible results if
the estimates are consistent in the sense of Lemma 5. Because I am not convinced that the estimates of W ∗i and
w∗i obtained under either of the scenarios (S1)-(S3) are based on valid assumptions on the type space, I refrain
from doing so.
8I have chosen (S3) because the resulting bootstrap confidence bands for the bounds tend to be considerably
narrower than under (S2), which allows for a better graphical representation.
23
05
10
15
20
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Auction
G
ai
n 
in
 %
Gains in Lower Bound obtained with Algorithm 2
Figure 5: Boxplots covering 90% confidence intervals of gains over estimated lower bound on the
estimated ex post rent to bidders in auctions t = 15,...,30 estimated for 80 bootstrap samples.
Upper whisker at third quartile, lower whisker at first, and middle whisker at median.
90% confidence level for at least five auctions, and furthermore they vary greatly across the
auctions. This suggests that any empirical investigation that uses the rent estimates – either
aggregate or individual – should take the bounding algorithm into account.
7 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed a discriminatory step function share auction with random participa-
tion. It has established equilibrium existence and derived a characterization of the equilibrium
bid schedules in terms of the optimality conditions both with respect to the submitted quan-
tities and with respect to the submitted prices. This characterization has yielded a twofold
contribution: The paper has, first, presented an estimator for upper and lower bounds on the
marginal valuation between the submitted quantity points, and second, it has derived an esti-
mator for the share of submitted price-quantity pairs that violate best response behavior. Both
contributions are likely to be important: The former to get narrower bands on rent estimates
in discriminatory step function share auctions, the latter to assess the assumptions that the
resampling procedure underlying any econometric approach to such share auctions makes on
the type space.
A Rationing rules
This appendix studies the pro-rata-on-the-margin rationing rule and the random rationing
rule mentioned in the text in some more detail.
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A.1 Pro-rata-on-the-margin rationing (Kastl 2011)
Suppose the clearing price pc is such that there are m≥ 2 bidders submitting a bid p ji = pc for
some j ∈ {1,...,k} (where the index j possibly differs between the tying bidders). Denote the
set of tying bidders by M ⊂ {1,...,n}. For every tying bidder i ∈M , let
Q i = β
−1
bi
(pc)− lim
p↓pcβ
−1
bi
(p)
be the marginal demand at the clearing price pc . Then, for any bidder i ∈ M , the received
quantity is
qci = limp↓pcβ
−1
bi
(p)+Q i ·
1−∑ j∈N limp↓pc β−1b j (p)∑
j∈M Q j
.
On the other hand, for the non-tying bidders i ∈ {1,...,n} \M , we have qci = β−1bi (pc), and
consequently, because qci is deterministic for any profile b and the corresponding clearing
price pc , the distribution H
b
i (q) is given by
H bi (q) =

0 if
∃ j ∈ K : p ji = pc
∨

q ∈

0,limp↓pc β−1bi (p)+Q i ·
1−∑ j∈N limp↓pc β−1b j (p)∑
j∈M Q j

∧> j ∈ K : p ji = pc∨q ∈ [0,β−1bi (pc))
1 else
.
A.2 Random rationing (McAdams 2003)
Suppose the clearing price pc is such that there are m≥ 2 bidders submitting a bid p ji = pc
for some j ∈ {1,...,k} (where the index j possibly differs between the tying bidders). Denote
the set of tying bidders by M = {1,...,m}. Let r = 1−∑i∈N limp↓pc β−1bi (p) be the excess supply
when approaching pc from above.
For the tying bidders i ∈ M , the allocation procedure is as follows: First, the auctioneer
uniformly draws an order ρ : M→M over the m bidders. Then, the auctioneer starts with the
first bidder ρ(1), allocates her
qc
ρ(1) = β
−1
bρ(1)
(pc),
and subtracts
β−1bρ(1)(p
c)− lim
p↓pcβ
−1
bρ(1)
(p)
from r. Then he proceeds to the second bidder ρ(2) in the order, allocates him
qc
ρ(2) = limp↓pcβ
−1
bρ(2)
(p)+min{β−1bρ(2)(pc)− limp↓pcβ
−1
bρ(2)
(p), r},
and again subtracts
β−1bρ(2)(p
c)− lim
p↓pcβ
−1
bρ(2)
(p)
from r. The procedure goes through the order ρ of bidders, and stops after r has become
negative for the first time.
For tying bidder i at clearing price pc and q ∈ [limp↓pc β−1bi (p),β−1bi (pc)), let Gbi (q) denote
the distribution of received quantity qci induced by such a procedure. Denoting by R the set
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of all orders ρ : M→M and by Ri j = {ρ ∈R :ρ( j) = i} the set of all orders such that bidder i
is at place j in the order, we have
Gbi (q) = 1−
∑
ρ∈Ri1
1
m!
−
m∑
j=2
∑
ρ∈Ri j
1
(
j−1∑
k=1

β−1bρ(k)(p
c)− lim
p↓pcβ
−1
bρ(k)
(p)

+q− lim
p↓pc
β−1bi (p))< r
)
1
m!
.
For bidder i and a realized bid-schedule profile b ∈ Bn, the probability Gbi (q) to win at most
q ∈ [limp↓pc β−1bi (p),β−1bi (pc)) is equal to the probability that the excess supply r is lower than
the sum of the marginal demand of those bidders in front of the queue (if there is any) and
the marginal demand by bidder i. Because the orders are drawn uniformly, each order ρ ∈R
has probability 1/m!. The discrimination between those orders in which player i is first in line
from those orders in which he is not stems from the fact that in the former case the marginal
demand by bidder i is always smaller than r.
For the non-tying bidders i ∈ {1,...,n} \M , we have qci = β−1bi (pc). Consequently, under
random rationing the distribution H bi (q) is for any profile b and corresponding clearing price
pc given by
H bi (q) =

0 if q ∈ [0,limp↓pc β−1bi (p))
Gbi (q) if
∃ j ∈ K : p ji = pc∨q ∈ limp↓pc β−1bi (p),β−1bi (pc)
1 else
.
B Proofs of Section 2
Proof of Lemma 1. Let
H(bi ,v−i ,a−i)i (q) =
∫
Bn−1
H(bi ,b−i)i (q)dµ
a1
1 (b1|v1)...dµai−1i−1 (bi−1|vi−1)×
dµai+1i+1 (bi+1|vi+1)...dµann (bn|vn), (31)
be the distribution of the quantity qci that bidder i submitting bi receives when opponents
play according to their strategies in µ−i , the opponent type profile is v−i , and the opponent
participation profile is a−i . Combining (1) and (31), I write the interim utility Πa−ii (bi , vi ,µ−i)
of player i conditional on the opponent participation profile a−i ∈ {0,1}n−1 as
Π
a−i
i (bi , vi ,µ−i) =
∫
x∈V n−1
∫ 1
0
[Vi(q)−Bi(q)]dH(bi ,x ,a−i)i (q)dη−i(x |vi), (32)
where Vi(q) =
∫ q
0 vi(q)dq, and Bi(q) =
∫ q
0 βbi (q)dq. Because [Vi(q)−Bi(q)] is continuous and
H(bi ,x)(q) is monotone, the inner integral of the right-hand side in (32) can be integrated by
parts (cf. Apostol, 1974, Theorem 7.6) to yield∫
x∈V n−1

−
∫ 1
0

vi(q)−βbi (q)

H(bi ,x ,a−i)i (q)dq
+ [Vi(q)−Bi(q)]H(bi ,x ,a−i)(q)
1
0

dη−i(x |vi). (33)
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Rearranging, and using the facts that H(bi ,x ,a−i)i (1) = 1, Vi(0) = 0, Bi(0) = 0, and∫
x∈V n−1
dη−i(x |vi) = 1,
we can rewrite (33) as
−
∫
x∈V n−1
∫ 1
0

vi(q)−βbi (q)

H(bi ,x ,a−i)i (q)dqdη−i(x |vi)+[Vi(1, vi)−Bi(1)] . (34)
Writing the first term in the sum of (34) as
−
∫
x∈V n−1
∫ 1
0
f (x ,q)dqdη−i(x |vi), (35)
with f (x ,q)= [vi(q)−βi(q)]H(bi ,x ,a−i)(q) being measurable and bounded on V n−1×[0,1], the
Fubini-Tonelli theorem (cf. Rudin, 1970, Theorem 8.8) can be applied to get that (35) is equal
to
−
∫ 1
0

vi(q)−βbi (q)
 ∫
x∈V n−1
H(bi ,x ,a−i)(q)dη−i(x |vi)dq. (36)
I now define, for q ∈ (q j−1i ,q ji ],
W j,a−ii (q|bi , vi ,µ−i) = 1−
∫
x∈V n−1
H(bi ,x ,a−i)(q)dη−i(x |vi).
This allows me to rewrite (36) as
−∑
j∈K
∫ q ji
q j−1i

vi(q)− p ji

(1−W j,a−ii (q|bi , vi ,µ−i))dq. (37)
Combining (34) and (37) finally yields
Π
a−i
i (bi , vi ,µ−i) =
∑
k∈K
∫ q ji
q j−1i

vi(q)− p ji

W j,a−ii (q|bi , vi ,µ−i)dq,
from which (2) follows immediately because
W ji (q|bi , vi ,µ−i) =
∑
x∈{0,1}n−1
W j,xi (q|bi , vi ,µ−i)g(x |ai = 1),
and
Πi(bi , vi ,µ−i) =
∑
x∈{0,1}n−1
Π
a−i
i (bi , vi ,µ−i)g(x |ai = 1)
hold by definition.
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Proof of Proposition 1. For a finite natural h, let Bh ⊂ B be a discrete action space defined as
Bh =
¦
p ji ,q
j
i
©
j=1,...,k
∈
§
0,
p
h
,2
p
h
, ..., p
ª
×
§
0,
1
h
,
2
h
, ...,1
ªk
:
p ji ≥ p j+1i ,q ji ≤ q j+1i ,qk+1i = 1, pk+1i = 0

.
The strategy in the proof is to first, for any finite natural h, establish existence of an equilibrium
µ∗h in the auction with action space Bh, and then use these equilibria to construct a sequence
µ∗h of equilibria whose limit µ∗ is an equilibrium of the game with the unrestricted action
space B.
LetMh ⊂M be the space of distributional strategies on V ×Bh. Define
φ(q; vi) =min
§
p ∈
§
0,
p
h
,2
p
h
, ..., p
ª
: p≥ vi(q)
ª
and let M¯h ⊂Mh be the set of strategies on V × B¯h with
B¯h =

bi ∈ Bh : βbi (q)≤φ(q; vi), ∀q ∈ [0,1]
	
.
That is, the strategies in M¯h only have those bids in their support such that, as h→∞, the
corresponding step functions lie weakly below the marginal valuation function. I begin with
a preliminary lemma that will be used later on.
Lemma 6. There is H > 0 such that for all h ≥ H, the following holds true: For any bidder
i∈{1,...,n}, bidding bi ∈Bh such that βbi (q)>φ(q; vi) is weakly dominated. If, for some strategy
profile µ∈ (Mh)n and share q∈ [q j−1,q j), it holds that limx↓q W ji (x |pi , vi ,µ−i)>0, then bidding
bi ∈ Bh such that βbi (q)>φ(q; vi) is strictly dominated.
Proof. By contradiction. Suppose p ji >φ(q; vi) for some j ∈ {1,...,k}. Take the lowest j for
which we find such a p ji . Then there exists
q¯ =max
¦
q ∈ [q j−1i ,q ji ]∩{0,1/h,2/h, ...,1} : p ji ≤φ(q; vi)
©
,
where I assume the maximum of the empty set above to be q j−1i . First, suppose q¯> q
j−1
i and h
large enough, and consider a deviation from (p ji ,q
j
i ) to (p
j
i +1/h,q−εh/h), where εh is given
by
εh =min{δ ∈N+ : pi +1/h≤ vi(q−δ/h)} .
As p ji + 1/h resolves potential ties at p
j
i (which always result in a received quantity q in
(q j−1i ,q
j
i ] under Assumption (A3) on the tie-breaking rule), the expected avoided loss by such
a deviation is bounded from below by the expected loss on the shares in [q¯,q ji ], that is, by
q ji∫
q¯
[p ji − vi(q)]W ji (q, |bi , vi ,µ−i)dq. (38)
On the other hand, the ex post loss from such a deviation is bounded above by
q¯−q j−1i
h
+
q¯∫
q¯−εh/h
vi(q)dq, (39)
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where the first term is an upper bound on the loss from bidding p ji +1/h rather than p
j
i
and winning at least q¯ and the second term is an upper bound on the loss from not win-
ning the shares q ∈ [q¯− εh/h, q¯]. Because Wi is left-continuous, we can conclude that, if
limq↓q¯ W ji (q|bi , vi ,µ−i)> 0, then there is H ∈ N+ such that for all h> H it holds that (p ji +
1/h, q¯−εh/h) is a strictly profitable deviation: the lower bound on the gain is independent of
h, and, because it follows from the fact that vi is decreasing that limh→∞εh/h = 0, the loss
vanishes as h approaches infinity. If, on the other hand, we have limq↓q¯ W ji (q|bi , vi ,µ−i) = 0,
then the bidder does not lose by reducing q ji to q¯ and leaving p
j
i unchanged, resulting in a
weakly profitable deviation. Second, suppose q¯ = q j−1i . Then, reducing q
j
i to q
j−1
i results in
a non-negative net gain (as p j+1i ≤ p ji ), and we also have a profitable deviation which will be
strict if limq↓q¯ W ji (q|bi , vi ,µ−i)> 0.
Going in increasing order through the steps j = 1,...,k at which there is p ji > φ(q
j
i , vi)
and adjusting the respective price-quantity pairs (p ji ,q
j
i ) in the manner described in the last
paragraphs yields a profitable deviation for h large enough, and thus the claim.
Lemma 6 allows to show that an equilibrium µ∗h in the strategy space (M¯h)n exists.
Lemma 7. There is H > 0 such that for any h>H, an equilibrium µ∗h ∈ (M¯h)n exists.
Proof. I begin by establishing that an equilibrium µ∗h ∈ (Mh)n exists. To this end, I rewrite the
interim utility such that the ex-ante utility can be expressed as in Milgrom and Weber (1985).
I write the interim utility for active bidder i that is conditional on a given participation profile
a−i ∈ {0,1}n−1 as
Π
a−i
i (bi , vi ,µ−i) =
∫
Bn−1×V n−1
ua−i (bi , b−i , vi)dµ1(b1|v1)...dµi−1(bi−1|vi−1)×
dµi+1(bi+1|vi+1)...dµn(bn|vn)dη−i(v−i|vi), (40)
where ua−i (bi , b−i , vi) is the utility form the share auction when only those bids are considered
that come from active players in the participation profile a−i . The unconditional interim utility
is then given by
Πi(bi , vi ,µ−i) =
∑
x∈{0,1}n−1
Πxi (bi , vi ,µ−i)g(x |ai = 1), (41)
that can be rewritten to
Πi(bi , vi ,µ−i) =
∫
Bn−1×V mn−1
 ∑
x∈{0,1}n−1
ua−i (bi , b−i , vi)g(x |ai = 1)
×
dµ1(b1|v1)...dµi−1(bi−1|vi−1)×dµi+1(bi+1|vi+1)...dµn(bn|vn)dη−i(v−i|vi). (42)
Consequently, we can proceed by defining
ui(b, vi) =
∑
x∈{0,1}n−1
ux(bi , b−i , vi)g(x |ai = 1)
and
Ui(µ) =
∫
B×V
Πi(bi , vi ,µ−i)dµi ,
giving us pii(µ) in equation (3.1) of Milgrom and Weber (1985). Now, with the assumptions
made on the type space V , it follows from the Helly’s selection theorem (Rudin, 1964) that V is
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compact, and thus complete and separable. Because the action space Bh is finite it is compact
and the utility ui is uniformly continuous in b ∈ (Bh)n. Uniform continuity of ui in v ∈ V n
follows because ui is continuous in v and V
n is compact. Hence, the assumptions of Theorem
1 in Milgrom and Weber (1985) are satisfied and we have existence of an equilibrium that we
denote by µ∗h.
In any equilibrium µ∗h ∈ (Mh)n with h large enough it must hold, by Lemma 6, for all
bidders i = 1,...,n and for a.e vi ∈ V , that the bids bi ∈ Bh in the support µ∗i,h(.|vi) satisfy
βbi (q) ≤ φ(q; vi) whenever limx↓q Wi(x |bi , vi ,µ−i) > 0 holds. So, we need to consider the
quantities q at which limx↓q Wi(x |bi , vi ,µ−i) = 0 holds. Observe that, if this holds for some
q ∈ (q j−1i ,q ji ] we have limx↓q′Wi(x |bi , vi ,µ−i)=0 for all q′> q. Hence, there is a minimal such
q that we denote by q¯. Assuming q¯ ∈ (q j−1i ,q ji ], bidder i does not loose utility by setting q ji
to q¯ and p j+1i to zero. Because bidder i does not win more than q¯ in equilibrium µ
∗
h, such a
change does not affect the winning probabilities of the other players and hence has no effect
on their utilities. By above arguments, there is an adapted strategy profile µ′h ∈ (M¯h)n that is
also an equilibrium.
Next, I consider a sequence of equilibria µ∗h ∈ (M¯h)n. Because the spaceM of probability
measures on B×V is compact in the weak*-topology (Milgrom and Weber, 1985), the se-
quence µ∗h ∈ (M¯h)n ⊂M n has a subsequence that converges to some µ∗ ∈M n. In order to
show that µ∗ is an equilibrium of the step function share auction with the unrestricted action
space B it is sufficient, by Remark 3.1 in Reny (1999), to show that the auction for action
space B is better reply secure when considering strategies in M¯ = limh→∞M¯h, and that for
every ε> 0 there is H > 0 such that for every h> H the profile µ∗h is an ε-equilibrium of the
auction with action space B.
Definition 6 (Better-Reply Security, cf. Reny 1999). Game G = (M¯ ,Ui)i∈N is better-reply
secure if whenever (µ∗,u∗) is in the closure of the graph {(µ,u) : u = U(µ)} of its vector payoff
function U and µ∗ is not a Nash equilibrium, then some player i can secure a payoff strictly above
u∗i at µ∗: There exists some µ˜i such that Ui(µ˜i ,µ−i)> u∗i for all µ−i in some open neighborhood
of µ∗−i .
Definition 7 (ε-equilibrium). A strategy profile µ ∈ M¯ n is an ε-equilibrium of game G =
(M¯ ,Ui)i∈N if Ui(µˆi ,µ−i)−Ui(µ)≤ ε for every µˆi ∈M¯ .
I start by showing better reply security for which I adapt the argument given in Reny
(1999) for the multi-unit auction case. To this end, let
M p = µ∈M¯ :∀vi ∈ V ∃bi ∈ B s.t. µi(bi|vi) = 1	 (43)
be the set of strategies that assigns to every valuation vi ∈ V a pure strategy bi ∈ B. Further
let
U¯(µ−i) = sup
µi∈M p
Ui(µi ,µ−i), (44)
such that the set
Bε(µ−i) =

µi ∈M p : |Ui(µi ,µ−i)− U¯(µ−i)| ≤ ε
	
(45)
describes, for every opponent profile µ−i ∈M n−1, the set of strategies µi ∈M p that yield
utility within ε> 0 of the supremum U¯(µ−i). The following observation is needed below.
Lemma 8. Assume (A2) and fix any µ−i ∈M n−1. Then, for every ε > 0 sufficiently small and
for any µi ∈ Bε(µ−i), Ui(µi , .) is continuous at µ−i .
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Proof. By contradiction. Take µi ∈ Bε(µ−i) and suppose Ui(µi , .) is not continuous at µ−i . If
Ui(µi , .) is not continuous atµ−i then there is bidder j∈{1,...,n} and price pc such that bidder i
and bidder j tie at pc with positive probability, that is, there are X ,Y ⊂ V with ηi(X ),η j(Y )>0
such that both bidders submit p ji = p
c and p jj = p
c (where j might be distinct for the two
bidders) with positive probability whenever they have valuation vi ∈ X and v j ∈ Y respectively.
By (A2), there are X ′,X ′′⊂ X with ηi(X ′),ηi(X ′′)>0 where ∀ f ∈ X ′ and ∀g ∈ X ′′ it holds that
f (q)> g(q), ∀q ∈ [0,1]. Hence, there is a set of bidder i types with strictly positive measure
that strictly prefer to avoid the tie, and can do so by raising p ji to p
j
i +δ for any δ > 0 small
enough. As the increase is strict, we have a contradiction to the assumption that µi ∈ Bε(µ−i)
for any ε> 0 sufficiently small.
Next, consider some (µ∗,u∗) that is not an equilibrium and that is in the closure of the
graph of the payoff function, i.e. that satisfies u∗= limn→∞U(µn) for some sequence µn→µ∗.
To show better-reply security, we need to establish that there is some bidder i that can secure
a payoff strictly above u∗i by deviating from µ∗i even if the other bidders also slightly deviate.
I distinguish two cases: (i) U(.) is continuous at µ∗ and (ii) U(.) is not continuous at µ∗.
Consider first the case of U(.) being continuous at µ∗. Then there is a bidder i, an ε >
0 small enough, and some µi ∈ Bε(µ∗−i) such that Ui(µi ,µ∗−i) > U(µ∗) = u∗. As Ui(µi , .) is
continuous at µ∗−i by Lemma 8, we have better reply security.
Second consider the case of U(.) being discontinuous at µ∗. Then there is some µn→ µ∗
such that u∗ = limn→∞U(µn), and there must be at least two bidder i and j tying at some
pc with positive probability, that is, there are X ,Y ⊂ V with ηi(X ),η j(Y )> 0 such that both
bidders submit p ji = p
c and p jj = p
c (where j might be distinct for the two bidders) with pos-
itive probability whenever they have valuation vi ∈ X and v j ∈ Y respectively. By (A2), there
are X ′,X ′′ ⊂ X with ηi(X ′),ηi(X ′′)> 0 where ∀ f ∈ X ′ and ∀g ∈ X ′′ it holds that f (q)> g(q),∀q ∈ [0,1]. Hence, there is a set of bidder i types with strictly positive measure that strictly
prefer to avoid the tie, and can do so by raising p ji to p
j
i +δ for any δ> 0 small enough. Con-
sider tying bidder i: it follows from Lemma 8 that ∃ε> 0 such that, for some n high enough,
bidder i can deviate to some µi ∈ Bε(µ∗−i) yielding Ui(µi ,µ−i,n)> Ui(µn) and, furthermore,
that
lim
n→∞Ui(µi ,µ−i,n) = Ui(µi ,µ
∗−i)> limn→∞Ui(µn) = u
∗
i , (46)
implying Ui(µi ,µˆ−i)> u∗i for all µˆ−i in a neighborhood of µ∗−i , which gives us better reply
security in this case, too.
It remains to establish that the members µ∗h of the sequence of equilibria µ∗h→ µ∗ are
ε-equilibria of the game with the unrestricted action space B, where ε→ 0 as h→∞. In
order to do so, it is sufficient to show that for every ε> 0 there is h high enough such that for
every action bi ∈ B there is a feasible action bhi ∈ Bh such that the ex-post loss from choosing
bi rather than b
h
i is smaller than ε, and that this holds uniformly in the strategies µ−i of the
other players (cf. Reny, 2011).
So, fix some finite natural h, some bidder i with vi and any bi for which it holds that
βbi (q)≤φ(q; vi), ∀q ∈ [0,1]. If bi ∈ Bh then we are done. So consider bi /∈ Bh. Let
bi =

(p1i ,q
1
i ), ...,(p
k
i ,q
k
i )
	
, (47)
and define
bi,h =
¦
(p1i,h,q
1
i,h), ...,(p
k
i,h,q
k
i,h)
©
, (48)
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with
p ji,h =min
§
p ∈
§
0,
p
h
,2
p
h
, ..., p
ª
: p≥ p ji
ª
(49)
q ji,h =min
§
q ∈
§
0,
1
h
,
2
h
, ...,1
ª
: q≤ q ji
ª
, (50)
for all j ∈ {1,...,k}. Above definitions guarantee that βbi,h(q)≤φ(q, vi) holds for all q ∈ [0,1]
and hence that bi,h is a feasible action. The ex-post loss sources from switching from bi to bi,h
are threefold:
1. There might be shares q at which it holds that βbi,h(q)>βbi (q) and that are won under
bi , that are also won under b
h
i but at a higher price. The loss from such quantities is
bounded above by
j∑
m=1
(q ji −q j−1i ) ph . (51)
2. There might be shares q at which it holds that βbi,h(q)> vi(q)≥βbi (q) and that are not
won under bi , but that are won under b
h
i . The loss from such quantities is bounded
above by
j∑
m=1
(q ji −q j−1i ) ph . (52)
3. There might be shares q at which it holds that βbi,h(q)<βbi (q) and that are won under
bi , but that are won under b
h
i . The loss from such quantities is bounded above by
j∑
m=1
q ji∫
q ji−1/h
vi(q)dq. (53)
Observing that all bounds (51)–(53) vanish as h→∞ independently, and hence uniformly,
in the strategies µ−i of the other players, we have that µ∗h is a sequence of ε-equilibria of the
auction with the unrestricted action space B where ε→ 0 when h→∞ as required.
Proof of Proposition 2. To start, observe that from Lemma 8 it follows that ties happen with
probability zero in equilibrium. Hence, for a.e. vi ∈ V and all bidders i, it holds at the sub-
mitted p ji and for all q ∈ [q j−1i ,q ji ] that
W ∗i (p
j
i ,q|vi) = 1−
∑
x∈{0,1}n−1
Fµ
∗,x
Si(p
j
i )
(q|vi)g(x |ai = 1), (54)
where the distribution Fµ
∗,x
Si(p
j
i )
(q|vi) is atomless on [q j−1i ,q ji ] and we have
Fµ
∗,x
Si(p
j
i )
(q|vi) = 1− Fµ∗,xS−1i (q)(p
j
i |vi)
for all x ∈ {0,1}n−1 from which it follows that
∂W ∗i (p
j
i ,q|vi)
∂ p ji
=
∑
x∈{0,1}n−1
f µ
∗,x
Si(p
j
i )
(q|vi)g(x |ai = 1). (55)
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for almost every q∈ [q j−1i ,q ji ]. Furthermore, it follows from (54) that the equilibrium interim
utility of agent i is given by
Πi(bi , vi ,µ
∗−i) =
j∑
k=1
q j∫
q j−1

vi(q)− p ji

W ∗i (p
j
i ,q|vi)dq.
Putting for j = 1,...,k multiplier λ j on the constraint that p
j
i ≤ p j−1i and multiplier ϕ j on the
constraint that q ji ≥ q j−1i , the Lagrangian associated with agent i’s optimizing problem is given
by
L =
k∑
j=1
q j∫
q j−1

vi(q)− p ji

W ∗i (p
j
i ,q|vi)dq−
j+1∑
k=1
λ j(p
j
i − p j−1i )−
j+1∑
k=1
ϕ j(q
j−1
i −q ji ), (56)
where pk+1i = q
0
i = 0, p
0
i = p, and q
k+1
i = 1. The optimality conditions obtained by setting
∂ L/∂ q ji = 0 for j = 1,...,k are given by
vi(q
j
i )− p ji

W ∗i (p
j
i ,q
j
i |vi)−

vi(q
j
i )− p j+1i

W ∗i (p
j+1
i ,q
j
i |vi)−(ϕ j+1−ϕ j) = 0. (57)
If we observe `i = k price-quantity points (p
j
i ,q
j
i ) submitted, with q
j
i ∈ (0,1), ∀ j ∈ {1,...,k},
then the bid-schedule bi is characterized by the conditions (57) where we have ϕ j = 0 for
all j ∈ {1,...,k}. If, however, we observe `i = k−1 bid points submitted with q ji ∈ (0,1), ∀ j ∈{1,...,`i}, then ϕ j > 0 holds for some j ∈ {1,...,k}. With ϕ j > 0, the optimality condition (57)
for step j is given by
vi(q
j
i )− p ji

W ∗i (p
j
i ,q
j
i |vi)−

vi(q
j
i )− p j+1i

W ∗i (p
j+1
i ,q
j
i |vi)+ϕ j = 0, (58)
and the optimality condition (57) for step j−1 is given by
vi(q
j−1
i )− p j−1i

W ∗i (q
j−1
i , p
j−1
i |vi)−

vi(q
j−1
i )− p ji

W ∗i (q
j−1
i , p
j
i |vi)−ϕ j = 0. (59)
Adding (58) and (59) and taking into account that q j−1i = q
j
i , we arrive at
vi(q
j−1
i )− p j−1i

W ∗i (q
j−1
i , p
j−1
i |vi)−

vi(q
j−1
i )− p j+1i

W ∗i (q
j−1
i , p
j+1
i |vi) = 0. (60)
All q j−1i , p
j−1
i , p
j+1
i are observable, they can be relabeled with indices j = 1,...,`i , such that we
have for all j ∈ {1,...,`i}
vi(q
j
i )− p ji

W ∗i (q
j
i , p
j
i |vi)−

vi(q
j
i )− p j+1i

W ∗i (q
j
i , p
j+1
i |vi) = 0. (61)
As we can repeat this argument for any `i < k observed, characterization (61) holds for any
`i ≤ k. It remains to look at q`ii = 1. Because we have p`i+1i = 0 by definition, the first order
condition reads as 
vi(q
`i
i )− p`ii

W ∗i (q
`i
i , p
`i
i |vi)−ϕ`i+1 = 0,
where ϕ`i+1 = 0 whenever q
`i
i ∈ (0,1) and ϕ`i+1≥ 0 whenever q`ii = 1, yielding the claim with
respect to (5).
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Because the distribution of Si(p
j
i ) is continuous on [q
j−1
i ,q
j
i ] it follows from (55) that
∂ L/∂ p ji = 0 is equivalent to
q j∫
q j−1

vi(q)− p ji

w∗i (p
j
i ,q|vi)−W ∗i (p ji ,q|vi)

dq−(λ j−λ j+1) = 0.
If we observe `i = k submitted bid points, then λ j = 0, ∀ j ∈ {1,...,k}, and we arrive at
q j∫
q j−1

vi(q)− p ji

w∗i (p
j
i ,q|vi)−W ∗i (p ji ,q|vi)

dq = 0.
If we observe `i = k−1 bid points submitted, then λ j is non-zero for some j ∈ {1,...,k}. By an
analogous argument as in the case of ϕ j > 0 above, we arrive at
q j+1i∫
q j−1i

vi(q)− p ji

w∗i (p
j
i ,q|vi)−W ∗i (p ji ,q|vi)

dq = 0
By appropriately relabeling the observed bid points and repeating the argument in order to
cover all cases `i < k, we conclude that
q ji∫
q j−1i

vi(q)− p ji

w∗i (p
j
i ,q|vi)−W ∗i (p ji ,q|vi)

dq = 0
holds for all j ∈ {1,...,`i}, ∀`i ≤ k. Lastly, we need to look at p1i = p. If so, the first order
condition reads as
q1i∫
0

vi(q)− p1i

w∗i (q, p1i |vi)−W ∗i (q, p1i |vi)

dq−λ1 = 0
where λ1≥ 0, finally yielding the claim with respect to (6).
C Proofs of Section 3
Proof of Lemma 3. Let
W ≡ ¦v ∈ V ji :ω j ≤ v≤ω j© ,
let the partial order on W be the point-wise partial order as defined in Definition 4 and let
the partial order on W ×W be the order defined in Definition 5. By the order on W ×W ,
the set W ×W being the product lattice of the complete lattice W is again a complete lattice.
Further, gu maps W into W , gl maps W into W , and both gu and gl are order-reversing
under the order on W . Hence, by the order on W ×W , the function g : W ×W →W ×W is
order preserving. Consequently the set of fixed points {v ∈W ×W : v = g(v)} is a complete
lattice by the Knaster-Tarski-Theorem. By construction of g in (12)–(13) it holds that Φ(g) =
{v ∈W ×W : v = g(v)}, and the statement follows.
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Proof of Proposition 3. It suffices to establish that (v j0, v
j
0)∈Φ(g). From the fact that the valua-
tions v ji ∈ V ji are decreasing it follows that for all q˜ ∈ [q j−1i ,q ji ] the functions vuq˜ : [q j−1i ,q ji ]→R
and v lq˜ : [q
j−1
i ,q
j
i ]→R defined as
vuq˜ (q) =
¨
max{v j0(q˜), v j0(q)} if q≤ q˜
v j0(q) if q> q˜
v lq˜(q) =
¨
v j0(q) if q≤ q˜
min{v j0(q˜), v j0(q)} if q> q˜
satisfy
q ji∫
q j−1i

vuq˜ (q)− p ji

w∗i (p
j
i ,q)−W ∗i (p ji ,q)

dq = 0 (62)
q ji∫
q j−1i

v lq˜(q)− p ji

w∗i (p
j
i ,q)−W ∗i (p ji ,q)

dq = 0. (63)
But then, by the construction of gu and gl in (12)–(13) and from the fact that the left-hand side
of (62) is strictly increasing in v j0(q˜)whenever v
j
0(q˜)≥ v j0(q˜) and that the left-hand side of (63)
is strictly decreasing in v j0(q˜) whenever v
j
0(q˜)≥ v j0(q˜), this implies that (v j0, v j0)∈Φ(g).
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